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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Franklin S. Osterhoudt appeals from his conviction following a jury trial for 
malicious injury to property. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The following testimony was presented by the state at Osterhoudt's trial 
for (misdemeanor) malicious injury to property. 
Jessica Adams owned a poker league that played poker on the outside 
deck of the 360 Main Street Bistro in Twin Falls on June 17, 2011. (Tr., p.46, 
L.22 - p.47, L.17.) Osterhoudt, one of the poker players that evening, was there 
with his friend Shae. (Tr., p.50, Ls.3-4.) Osterhoudt got into an argument with 
Ms. Adams after he started to take his poker chips with him to go into the 
restaurant to use the restroom. (Tr., p.48, L.14-22.) Ms. Adams asked 
Osterhoudt to leave the chips on the table, but Osterhoudt said he did not trust 
anybody there, and that they would take his chips if he left the table. (Tr., p.48, 
Ls.17-22) When Ms. Adams turned to talk to another person, someone called 
out, "hey, they just took their chips to the bathroom." (Tr., p.48, L.25 - p.49, L.3.) 
Ms. Adams followed Osterhoudt and Shae into the restaurant, where the 
only other person present was the bartender. (Tr. p.49, Ls.4-9.) When Ms. 
Adams entered the restaurant, she walked down the hallway to the bathroom 
area, where she noticed Osterhoudt's chips had been set on a ledge outside the 
bathroom door. (Tr., p.49, Ls.12-22.) Ms. Adams said, "hey, you guys can't take 
your chips back here," and Osterhoudt yelled from the bathroom, "I can do 
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whatever I want, those are my chips." (Tr., p.49, Ls.22-25.) Ms. Adams 
responded, "well, I own them, so I don't believe that you can." (Tr., p.49, L.25 -
p.50, L.1.) Osterhoudt and Shae came out of the bathroom and Ms. Adams told 
them, "maybe ... you guys need to come out ... you can't do this," and 
Osterhoudt said he was "done playing anyways." (Tr., p.50, Ls.3-10.) Ms. 
Adams told Osterhoudt it was "probably a good thing because you've been 
annoying all of the customers all night and they don't want to play with you any 
more anyway." (Tr., p.50, Ls.12-14.) Both men were "very intoxicated, 
constantly being loud and obnoxious and throwing their chips in and just making 
outrages [sic] bets." (Tr., p.50, Ls.18-20.) 
Osterhoudt told Ms. Adams, "fuck you, bitch, I can do whatever the hell I 
want," and began walking toward her when Shae stepped in between them, kind 
of like a mediator, saying "guys, let's not get into it." (Tr., p.51, Ls.1-9.) Ms. 
Adams said, "you guys, you know, this is over. I'm not doing this." (Tr., p.51, 
Ls.9-10.) Shae turned and walked back outside to the deck, and Ms. Adams 
followed him. (Tr., p.51, Ls.10-15.) However, Osterhoudt turned and walked 
back down the hallway, and when Ms. Adams got to the breezeway and opened 
the door, she heard banging which caused her to turn around and go back; 
Osterhoudt was gone, the glass back door to the restaurant had been shattered. 
(Tr., p.51, Ls.17-21.) During the following colloquy, Ms. Adam's further explained 
where Osterhoudt and Shae each went just before the back door was shattered: 
Q. As you're heading back out to the deck after you've had this 
confrontation with him? 
A. Uh-huh. 
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Q. Shae is leaving. Was he going out just in front of you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And are there any customers in there? 
A. There are absolutely no customers in the building 
whatsoever, besides the bartender. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And she was in another room. 
Q. Okay. And just before you hear the banging, what was the 
last thing you saw the defendant doing? 
A. Being confrontational. 
Q. I know. 
A. Yelling. 
Q. Okay. But was he walking - was he going out the back 
door? 
A. I couldn't tell you. 
Q. Okay. But he was back in the area of the back door? 
A. Yeah. He was in the hallway. There's no way to get out the 
hallway. 
Q. Okay. 
A. It's like an enclosed -
Q. Okay. There was no one else in the hallway? 
A. No. There's two bathrooms in the hallway. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And then the door to go outside. 
(Tr., p.51, L.24 - p.53, L.3 (emphasis added).) 
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Ms. Adams stated that "maybe five seconds at the most" elapsed from 
when she saw Osterhoudt in the hallway and when the glass door was shattered. 
(Tr., p.53, Ls.4-8.) When the back door was kicked, Ms. Adams was following 
Shae as they walked outside, so she believed Shae was not the person who 
kicked the back door. (Tr., p.54, Ls.17-23.) Conversely, Ms. Adams explained 
that the only person who was "back there" at the time the door was shattered 
was Osterhoudt, and that, apart from that door, "[t]here was no other exit." (Tr., 
p.54, Ls. 23-25; p.66, L.24 - p.67, L.1.) 
Ms. Adams opened the back door to see if Osterhoudt was still "back 
there," but he had "taken off." (Tr., p.53, Ls.19-23.) She then returned to the 
deck and asked Shae to find Osterhoudt, and that he (Osterhoudt) needed to 
come back. (Tr., p.53, L.24 - p.54, L.3.) Shae told Ms. Adams that Osterhoudt 
was the one that kicked in the door, and that he was trying to take care of 
Osterhoudt's problem because Osterhoudt had been in trouble before and he did 
not "want him to get in trouble for this." (Tr., p.73, Ls.16-22.) However, Shae did 
not bring Osterhoudt back to the restaurant, and told Ms. Adams that he did not 
know how to get a hold of him. (Tr., p.54, Ls.6-8; p.73, Ls.23-24.) Shae offered 
to pay for the door, but when Ms. Adams told him to find his friend or she would 
"call the cops," he took off and never provided her any money. (Tr., p.68, Ls.4-
15.) 
Twin Falls City Police Officer Rubin Murillo was dispatched to the 360 
Main Street Bistro to investigate, and he observed that the window door had 
been shattered. (Tr., p.83, Ls.7-21.) During the course of his investigation, 
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Officer Murillo was notified that Osterhoudt had been located, so he went to that 
location to talk to Osterhoudt about the broken door at the 360 Main Street 
Bistro. 1 (Tr., p.84, Ls.4-16.) When the officer asked Osterhoudt to explain what 
had occurred, Osterhoudt said "fuck the 360." (Tr., p.84, Ls.18-23.) When the 
O'fficer continued to ask Osterhoudt to explain what happened to the door at the 
360, Osterhoudt said, "fuck skaters, I don't like skaters . . . Fuck the skate 
park[,]" which made no sense to the officer. (Tr., p.84, L.25 - p.85, L.6.) When 
asked what "physical observations" the officer made about Osterhoudt, the officer 
said he "could smell alcohol coming from him. He seemed angry. His tone of 
voice, when he was responding to my questions." (Tr., p.85, Ls.7-12.) 
The state charged Osterhoudt with malicious injury to property, a 
misdemeanor (R., p.54), and after a trial, a jury convicted him of that crime (R., 
p.70). The magistrate court sentenced Osterhoudt to 90 days jail. (R., p.73.) 
Osterhoudt appealed to the district court (R, pp.74-77), which affirmed his 
conviction in a Memorandum Opinion on Appeal (R., pp.116-123, attached as 
Appendix A.) Osterhoudt timely appealed from that decision. (R., pp.124-127.) 
1 Officer Murillo did not explain, nor was he asked, when or where he questioned 
Osterhoudt. (See Tr., p.84, L.4 - p.85, L.15.) However, the prosecutor 
explained during a motion in limine hearing that Osterhoudt incurred an 
aggravated battery charge, and then fought with police, less than a half-hour 
after the incident at the 360 Main Street Bistro occurred. (Tr., p.4, L.1 - p.5, L.3.) 
The magistrate court ruled that detailed facts of that incident were inadmissible at 
trial. (Tr., p.8, L.23 - p.10, L.10.) 
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ISSUES 
Osterhoudt states the issues on appeal as: 
THE JUDGE ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO PRESENT 
404(B) EVIDENCE IN ITS CASE-IN-CHIEF 
THE THREAT OF A MISTRIAL COERCED MR. OSTERHOUDT 
TO REJECT PURSUING A THEORY OF THE CASE THAT 
INCLUDED A NEW WITNESS AND NEW THEORY OF 
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPORT THE 
MAGISTRATE COURT'S JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6 (verbatim).) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Osterhoudt failed to show any reversible error regarding the magistrate 
court's rulings in limine? 
2. Has Osterhoudt failed to demonstrate that the magistrate court coerced him 
into not calling a witness to testify? 
3. Has Osterhoudt failed to show that the evidence was insufficient to convict 




Osterhoudt Has Failed To Show Any Reversible Error Regarding The Magistrate 
Court's Rulings In Limine 
A Introduction 
Prior to trial, Osterhoudt filed a Motion in Limine which sought exclusion of 
the following evidence or testimony at trial: 
1. Either the misdemeanor or the felony he received just after 
this, as they are irrelevant and they constitute 404(b) Propensity 
[sic] evidence at best. 
2. The audio recording of questions asked to Mr. Osterhoudt, 
since it was gathered at a time when he was under arrest for the 
above but not Mirandized. 
3. Any previous criminal charges or convictions, as they are 
irrelevant and they constitute 404(b) Propensity [sic] evidence at 
best.[2J 
4. An¥: family relationship to Franklin W. Osterhoudt, as it is 
irrelevant. 3l 
5. His having consumed any alcohol that evening, as it is 
irrelevant and more unduly prejudicial than probative. 
(R., pp.34-36.) 
After hearing arguments on Osterhoudt's motion in limine, the magistrate 
court ruled: (1) "evidence that [Osterhoudt] was convicted of a felony or other 
crimes" arising from an incident that occurred shortly after he left the 360 Main 
2 At the hearing on Osterhoudt's motion in limine, the prosecutor stated that he 
had no intention of presenting evidence of any prior criminal convictions. (Tr., 
p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.1.) 
3 When asked at the motion in limine hearing whether there was any issue about 
presenting evidence about any family relationship to Osterhoudt, the prosecutor 
said he did not "know what that even means." (Tr., p.7, Ls.3-5.) 
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Street Bistro would not be admissible (Tr., p.8, L.23 - p.9, L.4) (2) the audio 
recordings were admissible (Tr., p.9, Ls.16-19); (3) testimony about Osterhoudt's 
general display of anger and aggressive behavior towards others (including 
police officers) during an (aggravated battery) incident that occurred shortly after 
he left the 360 Main Street Bistro would be admitted, but the details of that 
incident (such as the nature of injuries involved) would be excluded (Tr., p.10, 
Ls.2-1 O); and (4) evidence of Osterhoudt's intoxication was admissible (Tr., p.8, 
Ls.3-22). 
On appeal, the district court rejected Osterhoudt's claim that the 
magistrate court reversibly erred in its rulings on his motion in limine, determining 
that the evidence complained of in his first four requests was never presented at 
trial, and the evidence about Osterhoudt's alcohol consumption the evening of 
his offense was properly admitted. (R., p.119 (see Appendix A).) On appeal to 
this Court, as in the district court, Osterhoudt argues the magistrate court erred 
by permitting the state to present "404(b)" evidence of his "alcohol use, his un-
Mirandized statements made while under arrest, and proof of his demeanor after 
he had been beaten by a different police officer in a separate case." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.10; see R., p.100 (same).) Osterhoudt's argument lacks merit 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the 
province of the trial court." State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77 
(Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). "[A] trial court's determination as to the 
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admission of evidence at trial will only be reversed where there has been an 
abuse of that discretion." ~ 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). 
C. Osterhoudt Has· Failed To Demonstrate Reversible Error By The 
Magistrate Court's Ruling In Limine 
On appeal, the district court rejected Osterhoudt's argument that the 
magistrate court erred in denying his motion in limine requests, initially 
concluding that the first four requests were rendered irrelevant because the state 
did not present the challenged evidence at trial: 
With one exception the Court finds it unnecessary to analyze 
whether these rulings were or were not correct. The only evidence 
that the state offered in this case regarding these allegations was 
the observations of Officer Murillo regarding alcohol consumption 
and anger displayed by the defendant. There was no evidence 
offered regarding categories (1) to (4). Thus, even if the magistrate 
erred in his rulings on these issues, the error is harmless because 
the evidence was never offered by the State. As to category five, 
the Court finds that the magistrate's ruling was correct. The 
defendant's state of mind was directly relevant to the issue of 
whether he acted maliciously in damaging the door and the 
probative value was not outweighed by prejudice. The 
observations of consumption of alcohol by Murillo were not only 
cumulative to other evidence already in the record, but relevant to 
his state of mind as were the observations about anger. The 
magistrate did not error [sic] in admitting this evidence. 
(R., p.119 (see Appendix A).) The district court correctly determined that the first 
four requests in Osterhoudt's motion in limine, even if erroneous, were harmless 
because the evidence he sought to exclude was not presented at trial. (Id.) 
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In regard to Osterhoudt's fifth and last request in his motion in limine --
that the state be precluded from presenting evidence of his alcohol consumption 
(and angry demeanor)4 that evening -- the district court reasonably determined 
that Officer Murillo's testimony was relevant to "the issue of whether [Osterhoudt] 
acted maliciously in damaging the door" of the 360 Main Street Bistro. 5 (Id.) The 
magistrate court had previously explained in a little more detail how Osterhoudt's 
alcohol consumption was relevant to show his "malicious"6 intent when he 
committed that act, and that such evidence would not be unduly prejudicial: 
As to whether he was drinking alcohol, we have the question of 
relevance. My ruling is that it is relevant, because if he's drinking 
he's more likely to do the kinds of things he's accused of. 
Then the question is, is it unduly prejudice [sic] such that the 
prejudice outweighs the relevance. My feeling on that is that it is 
not more prejudicial than probative. He was at a nightclub, he was 
-- if the evidence is that he was intoxicated, I understand that may 
be prejudicial to a degree, but I think it is quite relevant to this issue 
that the jury will be asked to decide and that it's [sic] relevance is 
not outweighed by it's [sic] prejudice. 
4 Osterhoudt's motion in limine in the magistrate court did not seek to exclude 
evidence about his angry demeanor. (See R., pp.34-36.) However, the 
magistrate court ruled that evidence about Osterhoudt's general anger and 
aggressiveness toward other people (including a police officer) following the 
incident at the nightclub was admissible. (Tr., p.10, Ls.2-10.) 
5 During trial, Officer Murillo testified that when he contacted Osterhoudt after the 
incident at the nightclub and asked him about what had transpired at the 360 
Main Street Bistro, Osterhoudt said, "fuck the 360," and his tone of voice made it 
seem like he was angry. (Tr., p.84, L.18 - p.85, L.12.) The officer also explained 
that Osterhoudt had the smell of alcohol coming from him. (Tr., p.85, Ls.7-9.) 
6 The jury was instructed that '"Malice' and 'maliciously' means the desire to 
annoy or injure another or the intent to do a wrongful act." (R., p.62 (Instruction 
No. 14B).) 
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(Tr., p.8, Ls.10-22.) The magistrate court's conclusion that Osterhoudt's 
intoxication was "quite relevant" to show he was more likely to have become 
angry and to have damaged property is an everyday common sense deduction 
that needs no additional explanation or support. The district court properly 
weighed that relevance against the danger of unfair prejudice (see I.R.E. 403) 
and found that the magistrate court did not err in allowing the state to present 
such testimony at trial to prove Osterhoudt damaged the door of the nightclub 
maliciously. (R., p.119 (see Appendix A).) 
Even were this Court to conclude that the district court abused its 
discretion by allowing Officer Murillo to testify about Osterhoudt's alcohol 
consumption and angry demeanor shortly after the incident at the 360 Main 
Street Bistro, any such abuse would merely constitute harmless error. Idaho 
Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. "The inquiry is 
whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the 
defendant] even without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. 
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 
(1999)); see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Based on the trial testimony, as set forth in the Statement Of Facts (etc.), supra, 
even without the testimony of Officer Murillo, this Court should find that, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted Osterhoudt of malicious 
injury to property. 
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In sum, Osterhoudt has failed to demonstrate that the magistrate court 
committed any reversible error in ruling on his first four requests in his motion in 
limine, inasmuch as the state never presented the challenged evidence at trial. 
In regard to his fifth request in his motion in limine, Osterhoudt has failed to show 
that the magistrate court abused its discretion in allowing Officer Murillo to testify 
about Osterhoudt's alcohol consumption and angry demeanor shortly after the 
incident at the 360 Main Street Bistro; moreover, the record demonstrates that 
even if such a ruling was erroneous, it was, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
harmless. 
11. 
Osterhoudt Failed To Demonstrate That The Magistrate Court Coerced Him Into 
Not Calling A Witness To Testify 
Osterhoudt's argument that the magistrate court coerced him into 
foregoing calling Shae Lamp as a witness is, as the district court explained, 
completely belied by the record. (R., pp.120-121; see Tr., p.80, L.19 - p.81, 
L.19.) The state fully relies upon the district court's Memorandum Opinion on 
Appeal (R., pp.116-123 (see Appendix A)) for its responsive argument on this 




Osterhoudt Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Was Insufficient To Convict 
Him Of Malicious Injury To Property 
A. Introduction 
Osterhoudt contends "[t]he Appellate Court should find that the evidence 
presented in the entirety of the hearing was insufficient to support a verdict of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Review of the trial 
testimony shows this contention to be without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 711, 184 P.3d at 217 (citing Losser, 145 Idaho 
670, 183 P.3d 758)). The appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to 
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law 
follow from those findings." ~ "If those findings are so supported and the 
conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's 
decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district court's decision as a matter of 
procedure." ~ (citing Losser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 
102 Idaho 559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981)). 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); 
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State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 
Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review 
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 
607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 
Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn 
from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. Miller, 
131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. 
C. The Evidence Supports Osterhoudt's Conviction For Malicious lniury To 
Property 
Osterhoudt has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the 
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of malicious injury to 
property. 7 The trial testimony provided the jury with sufficient evidence upon 
which to conclude, through circumstantial evidence, that Osterhoudt maliciously 
shattered the back window-door of the 360 Main Street Bistro because he was 
7 In order to convict Osterhoudt of malicious injury to property the jury was 
required to find beyond a reasonable doubt the following: 
1. OnoraboutJune17,2011. 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant Franklin Osterhoudt maliciously 
4. injured property 
5. not the defendant's own. 
(R., p.61 (Instruction No. 14A).) 
As noted previously, the jury was instructed that '"Malice' and 'maliciously' 
means the desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to do a wrongful act." 
(R., p.62 (Instruction No. 14B).) 
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mad at Ms. Adams for demanding that he not take his poker chips with him to the 
bathroom area inside the restaurant. See State v. Streeper, 113 Idaho 662, 665, 
747 P.2d 71, 74 (1987) ("[A] defendant may be convicted solely on circumstantial 
evidence."); State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 704, 132 P.3d 455, 461 (Ct. App. 
2005) ("Evidence that is entirely circumstantial may suffice to support a verdict, 
and substantial evidence does not mean that the evidence need be 
uncontradicted."); State v. Simmons, 120 Idaho 672, 679, 818 P.2d 787, 794 (Ct. 
App. 1991) ("A conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, and the 
conclusion of guilt may be based on proof of the circumstances and the probable 
deductions from those circumstances.") 
The state relies on (a) the district court's Memorandum Opinion On Appeal 
(R., pp.116-123 (see Appendix A)), and (b) the state's rendition of trial testimony 
set forth in its Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings, supra, and 
incorporates them as its response to this issue as if fully set forth herein to show 
there was sufficient evidence presented at trial from which a rational juror could 
convict Osterhoudt for committing malicious injury to property. 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests this Court to affirm Osterhoudt's conviction for 
malicious injury to property. 
DATED this 2ih day of December, 2012. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 1WIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANKLIN SCOTT OSTERHOUDT, 
Defendant. 
Fritz Wonderlich, City Attorney, for the State. 
Case No. CR 2011-7723 
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON APPEAL 
Nathan Austin, Deputy Public Defender, for the Defendant. 
INTRODUCTION 
The 360 Bistro Restaurant is located on Main Avenue in the City of Twin Falls. 
The building consists of an eating area and bar, bathrooms and an outside patio area. 
There is a door permitting access to the patio area, and a separate door near the 
bathroom area which exits to the back of the building. This latter door is glass but has a 
plexi-glass covering over the door itself. 
On June 17, 2011 the facility sponsored a poker league. The players were issued 
poker chips by the administrator Jessica Adams ("Adams") and the participants played 
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poker on the outside deck. The Defendant arrived at the facility around 8 P.M. that day 
and played poker until approximately 9:45 P.M. At that time, he and his friend Shae 
Lamp ("Lamp") went to the men's bathroom, taking their chips with them. Upon noticing 
this, Adams followed them to the bathroom area, saw the chips sitting on a ledge 
outside of the bathroom and advised them that they were not permitted to take the chips 
with them. Osterhoudt stated that "I can do whatever I want, those are my chips." 
Adams responded with "[W]ell I own them, so I don't believe that you can." Osterhoudt 
stated that he was "done playing anyways" and Adams responded "that's probably a 
good thing because you've been annoying all of the customers all night and they don't 
want to play with you any more anyway." It is undisputed that the defendant was drunk, 
used foul language and was otherwise disruptive to the other customers. 
After muttering an expletive Osterhoudt moved towards Adams stating "I can do 
whatever the hell I want." Lamp intervened stopping Osterhoudt and then walked 
outside to the deck. Adams turned to follow him. Osterhoudt turned around and walked 
towards the plexi glass covered door. As Adams started to walk out to the patio and 
within 5 seconds of losing sight of Osterhoudt she heard a "banging" sound. She 
immediately turned around, approached the back door and discovered that it had been 
shattered. When she heard the noise, the only person in the restaurant or near the 
back door was the bartender. Upon reaching the door, Osterhoudt was not in the 
vicinity. No one actually saw Osterhoudt kick or punch the door. No one could tell 
whether the door was kicked 'from the inside or the outside. 
Officer Murrillo of the Twin Falls Police Department came to the scene and 
eventually went to a location where Osterhoudt was located. He testified without 
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objection that Osterhoudt smelled of alcohol, was angry and that he continued to use 
expfetives such as "f--- the 360." Osterhoudt was arrested on the charge of malicious 
injury to property for damaging the door at the 360, pied not guilty and proceeded to a 
jury trial on November 30, 2011. The jury convicted him. He has timely appealed from 
the verdict and judgment of conviction. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Osterhoudt raises three issues on appeal: 
1. The judge erred in allowing the state to present 404(8) evidence in its case in 
chief. 
2. The threat of a mistrial coerced Mr. Osterhoudt to reject pursuing a theory of the 
case that included a new witness and new theory of exculpatory evidence. 
3. There was insufficient evidence to support the magistrate court's judgment of 
conviction. 
ANALYSIS AND DECISION 
1. The claimed error of the trial court regarding 404(b) evidence is harmless. 
The trial court's pretrial order states that if the State wishes to use 404(b) 
evidence that notice thereof must be given to the defendant at least five days prior to 
trial absent a finding of good cause why this deadline was not reasonable. On 
November 28, 2011 the defendant filed a Motion in Limine regarding 404(b) evidence. 
That motion sought exclusion of: (1) a misdemeanor or felony charge committed by 
Osterhoudt after the incident at the 360 Bistro; (2) an audio recording of questions 
asked the defendant; (3) any previous criminal charges or convictions of the defendant; 
(4) any reference to Defendant's family and (5) any evidence of alcohol consumption. 
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On the morning of trial the Court ruled on this motion. On item (1) the Court ruled 
that there could be no evidence of a conviction, but ruled with some limitations that the 
state could inquire about the circumstances of the charge ultimately filed against 
Osterhoudt finding that this was relevant to defendant's state of mind. The Court 
permitted the State to use the audio recording. Although the record is not completely 
clear on this point, it appears that the Court granted the motion on (3) and (4) but 
allowed Officer Murillo to testify concerning his observations of Osterhoudt, which would 
include observations about alcohol consumption. 
With one exception the Court finds it unnecessary to analyze whether these 
rulings were or were not correct. The only evidence that the state offered in this case 
regarding these allegations was the observations of Officer Murillo regarding alcohol 
consumption and anger displayed by the defendant. There was no evidence offered 
regarding categories (1) to (4). Thus, even if the magistrate erred in his rulings on these 
issues, the error is harmless because the evidence was never offered by the State. As 
to category five, the Court finds that the magistrate's ruling was correct. The defendant's 
state of mind was directly relevant to the issue of whether he acted maliciously in 
damaging the door and the probative value was not outweighed by prejudice. The 
observations of consumption of alcohol by Murillo were not only cumulative to other 
evidence already in the record, but relevant to his state of mind as were the 
observations about anger. The magistrate did not error in admitting this evidence. 
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2. The threat of a mistrial did not coerce defendant into abandoning his defense of 
the case. 
Over the noon recess, during trial, witness Shae Lamp ("Lamp") approached the 
public defender with information about the case. Based upon the information received, 
counsel for the defendant advised the court that he intended to call this witness. The 
Court indicated it would allow Lamp to testify but only after State's counsel was allowed 
to interview the witness. The city attorney reported that Lamp would testify that the door 
was "broken before the defendant exited."1 The city attorney argued that because the 
State had no notice that this witness might be called that it was unable to meet the 
substance of this proposed testimony. Counsel for the State remarked, "If this is going 
to be allowed, I think we are going to ask for a mistrial." The Court then stated that it 
was really anxious to get other cases out of the way because of the number of cases 
pending. The Court then said to defense counsel, "What do you think, Mr. Austin?" 
Defense counsel responded that the defense would not call Lamp as a witness and thus 
there was no need to call rebuttal witnesses. The record establishes that not only did 
the defense not call Lamp, but that he did not call any witnesses at all. 
Defendant argues the foregoing scenario establishes that the magistrate "coerced" 
defendant to waive calling Lamp as a witness because the Court "threatened" to declare 
a mistrial which would have resulted in Osterhoudt remaining in jail for at least another 
21 days until the next available trial date.2 The record does not support this assertion. 
1 It is not clear whether Lamp was prepared to testify that the Osterhoudt broke the door before he himself 
exited the building, or whether Osterhoudt had nothing to do with breaking the door because it was 
damaged before the confrontation between Adams and Osterhoudt. 
2 In the brief filed by the Defendant counsel speaks of the "demeanor and language of the judge." The 
language of the judge simply does not support Osterhoudt' s argument. If the "demeanor" of the judge 
induced defense counsel to waive presentation of this witness there is nothing in the record to support 
this assertion. The appellant bears the burden of showing error. If the magistrate's "demeanor" was as· 
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The State, not the court, brought up the subject of mistrial. The Court did not 
threaten a mistrial or even bring up that subject. After ruling that Lamp could be called 
as a witness and after the State brought up the subject of a mistrial, the Court simply 
inquired of defense counsel, "What do you think?" Counsel immediately stated his 
election not to call Lamp. The Court then stated, "Okay. Well, if that's your choice that's 
fine." The record clearly reflects that defense counsel waived the right to call Lamp. If 
there is any basis for claimed error regarding this matter, it is invited error by defense 
counsel. There is no merit to Osterhoudt' s second claim of error. 
3. There was sufficient evidence to support the iury's verdict. 
The State called two witnesses at trial, Adams and Murillo. The facts set forth 
above are essentially undisputed and represent the material aspects of their testimony. 
The defendant did not materially impeach any of their testimony. Nor did the defendant 
himself testify or call any witnesses. This is a circumstantial evidence case. It is not the 
function of this Court on appeal to "second guess" a jury's verdict so long as there is 
substantial evidence to support the verdict. In this case, there is substantial evidence 
that Osterhoudt, in a fit of rage, walked out the back door and kicked or punched it, 
either before or after he opened the door. The picture of the door demonstrates that 
substantial force was applied, thus demonstrating maliciousness. Though only 
circumstantial, the evidence clearly supports a finding by the jury that Osterhoudt is the 
only person who could have caused the damage. His demeanor and repeated 
expletives about the facility and Ms. Adams corroborates the jury's finding that 
coercive as counsel suggests then counsel should have made a record of that observation. This record 
does not support a finding that the Court would have granted a mistrial. 
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Osterhoudt committed the act as charged. There is substantial evidence to support the 
jury's verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated the Court finds no error in this case. The verdict and 
judgment of conviction are AFFIRMED. 
DATED thi > da 
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P.O. Box 1812 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Nathan Austin, Deputy 
Twin Falls County Public Defender 
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Judge 
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